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Do inside directors affect sustainability performance? A test of a contingency approach  
 
ABSTRACT: As boards are increasingly responsible for addressing sustainability and accountable for 
the extent to which they do so, this study’s point of departure is to examine the impact of inside directors 
on sustainability performance. By creating an aggregate measure that accounts for economic, 
environmental, and social metrics, this study finds that insiders are negatively related to sustainability 
performance. However, when the variables of compensation linked to environmental and social metrics, 
sustainability training, and comprehensive company codes of conduct are introduced, their interactive 
effects positively moderate the insider-sustainability performance relationship. Implications of findings 
are discussed, along with future research directions and limitations.    
 
Keywords: Boards of directors, corporate governance, performance, sustainability 
Business response to sustainability—or firms meeting the needs of their current stakeholders, while 
maintaining their ability to meet the needs of their future stakeholders, by consistently delivering positive 
outcomes across economic, environmental, and social dimensions—is attracting the attention of boards of 
directors (Wagner, Hespenheide & Pavlovsky 2009). However, board composition can potentially limit or 
constrain the degree to which directors influence a firm’s sustainability performance. Inside directors 
(“insiders”), for example, are those directors that are employees of a firm and are top corporate officers 
(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996). Insiders do bring value to boards; namely, their valuable information 
and firm-specific knowledge (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008). Yet, because of management’s short-term 
orientation (Marginson and McAulay, 2008), insiders on the board, who represent management interests, 
might undermine or hinder the commitment required to the decisions that are needed to meet current and 
future stakeholder needs—including those that influence positive outcomes in environmental and social 
dimensions. In other words, insiders are expected to favour economic interests over environmental and 
social interests. Hence, if a firm substantively attempts to pursue a tripartite objective that includes 
economic, environmental, and social considerations, and relies on the board to oversee and advance this 
objective, are there conditions under which inside directors might therefore positively affect sustainability 
performance? 
 This paper makes three key contributions. First, drawing on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 
1976), incentives (e.g. shareholdings in the firm) are expected to more closely align management interests 
and shareholder interests so that economic performance is maximized. Incentives tied to economic 
performance, however, could undermine environmental and social outcomes, detracting from a firm’s 
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overall sustainability performance. By studying incentives that are linked to environmental and social 
metrics, this study advances the incentives stream within corporate governance research. Second, research 
reveals that companies that seek to advance the principles of sustainability are putting in place training 
and development programs for management—including top company officers who are board members 
(Ricart, Rodriguez & Sanchez 2005). This study expands empirical findings on the value of creating 
awareness about sustainability issues, determining if training on sustainability positively moderates the 
relationship between insiders and sustainability performance. Lastly, firms are using company codes of 
conduct to embed expected employee behaviours towards stakeholders and to promulgate a sustainability 
ethic (Ricart et al. 2005), yet little research examines the influence of such codes on the relationship 
between insiders and firm outcomes. To test the value of such approaches, this paper determines if a 
comprehensive company code of conduct positively moderates inside board members’ influence on 
sustainability performance.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Following the progenitors of agency theory (Fama & Jensen 1983), Fairfax (2010) builds a case that 
insiders can offer value to the board. More specifically, Fairfax (2010) contends that a board’s 
effectiveness largely depends on the quality of information used. Because they have superior knowledge 
about the firm, and have intimate knowledge of the firm’s financial context, and its industry and 
environment (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990), insiders are expected to have an informational advantage 
over independent directors. This informational advantage by insiders is predicted to translate into 
effective decision-making—and even monitoring (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990). However, there is a 
counter argument that questions the extent to which insiders will influence sustainability performance. 
First, while it is recognized that insiders are moral agents and may have motivation to respond to 
non-financial issues, and that they might profess concern over the longer-term interests of the firms they 
govern, it is unclear as to what extent these would take precedence over short-term economic results. For 
example, evidence demonstrates that corporate executives serving on boards believe they have a primary 
responsibility to maximizing shareholder returns. In fact, those surveyed put forth that they believe that 
their legal duties favour shareholders—and maximizing their returns—over all other stakeholders and 
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society (Rose 2007). To achieve this, they would even cut down a mature forest or release unregulated 
toxins into the environment in order to increase profits (Rose 2007). Results such as this question the 
extent to which insiders will give equal attention to environmental and social issues. 
 Second, management is emboldened to shareholders, and this requires decisions that maximize 
profits (Rechner & Dalton 1991). As representatives of management interests on the board, insiders 
perceive that their first—if not only—obligation is a duty and care to shareholders, which equates to 
maximizing their wealth (Rose 2007). However, this over-arching focus on profit maximization can lead 
to excessive short-termism (Marginson & McAulay 2008). As insiders address their responsibility to 
maximizing shareholder returns, they are likely to seek to influence decisions that concern shorter-term 
economic outcomes, rather than those that might have longer-term impacts, such as those required to 
impact on a firm’s sustainability performance.  
Thus, following Boyd (1995), this study explores the extent to which contingency variables affect 
the influence of corporate governance on firm outcomes. Specifically, the main research question seeks to 
determine if three key contingency variables—incentives, sustainability training, company codes of 
conduct—positively moderate the negative relationship between insiders and sustainability performance.   
Incentives  
Agency theory focuses on the problems that arise when ownership is separated from control (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Here, principals (shareholders) turn over control to agents (management) to act on their 
behalf, working to ensure that their investment is maximized. However, one specific problem that arises 
from the separation of ownership and control is moral hazard. Management (agents) may act unreservedly 
in its own narrowly defined self-interest. For example, managers may grant themselves substantial pay 
increases, extravagant perks, and the like, through the misuse of shareholder funds and free cash flows 
(Fama & Jensen 1983). Such actions decrease shareholder wealth. 
 One way to curb the problem of moral hazard is to better align principals’ and agents’ interests. 
For example, offering incentives to corporate officers on the board, such as shareholdings in the firm or 
cash bonuses, has the potential to improve short-term economic results (Peng & Roell 2008). This is 
because corporate officer incentives are often tied to share price performance or profitability, which is 
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generally linked to quarterly or annual returns (Salter 2012). Seeking to improve sustainability 
performance, on the other hand, creates risk and uncertainty because investments that meet environmental 
and social objectives may be difficult to quantify in monetary terms, may only payoff in the long-term, 
and may require some economic returns to be sacrificed (Bansal 2005). There is evidence to suggest, for 
example, that environmental performance can negatively impact short-term returns (Hart & Ahuja 1996). 
Further, Shrivastava and Hart (1995: 157) suggest that sustainability requires a “complete redesign of 
organisations and strategies”. This requires a great deal of extra managerial effort; therefore, management 
may prefer to expend time and resources on known pathways and strategies that have less risk and greater 
quantified, shorter-term financial benefits. 
 Given executive directors’ more general short-term focus and economic mind-set (Stevens, 
Steensma, Harrison & Cochran 2005), they may be reluctant to exert the effort required to improve 
sustainability performance in preference to seeking to influence the board to channel resources into 
strategies that have clear financial parameters and that lift the more immediate economic performance of 
the firm. Thus, all things being equal, the expectation is that inside directors are negatively related to 
sustainability performance. Therefore, they need to be motivated to account for all three dimensions of 
sustainability performance. One way to do this is to tie a portion of insiders’ compensation packages to 
environmental and social performance. As insiders are offered incentives to consider non-financial 
objectives or measures of performance, they are more likely to pay attention to sustainability in its 
broader dimensions, and are more likely to take into account strategies that can lift the non-financial 
performance of the firms they oversee (Kock, Santaló & Diestre 2012). Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: Compensation linked to environmental and social outcomes positively moderates 
the insider-sustainability performance relationship. Specifically, the negative relationship 
between insiders on the board and sustainability performance is positively moderated by insider 
compensation linked to environmental and social metrics. 
Sustainability training 
The literature is beginning to recognize the importance of training management about the intricacies and 
complexities of sustainable development. Galbreath (2009) notes that to respond effectively to 
sustainability, management needs to understand relevant opportunities and risks. For example, 
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sustainability encompasses a large variety of strategic issues, which may vary in importance given 
industry context and regulatory environment (Galbreath 2009). Corporate officers must be aware of these. 
In another example, shareholders, who are traditionally believed to concern themselves mainly with 
returns on their investments, are now demonstrating a growing interest in the degree to which the firms 
they invest in address environmental and social issues (Hanson & Tranter 2006). Lastly, to address 
sustainability, “processes and products need to be re-invented, controlling systems have to integrate new 
sets of data, external and internal communication strategies require revisions and basic values and 
knowledge systems need to adapt…[these challenges]…can hardly be met by applying ready-made 
concepts or by implementing conventional strategies with different contents” (Siebenhüner & Arnold 
2007: 340). In short, change, training, and learning are required.  
According to the United Nations (UN 2008), changing management attitudes to appreciate the 
challenges of sustainability is key to firms’ on-going success, not an optional add-on. However, the 
literature also acknowledges that inside directors bring certain cognitive perspectives and biases, and a 
business orientation that can favour the status quo, such that they are likely to be biased towards 
efficiency and short-term results (Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson 1993). One way to overcome 
these biases and orientations is to offer corporate officers (including officers that sit on the board) training 
about sustainability (Ricart et al. 2005). This could address, among other things, the nature of investments 
required for sustainability, insights into how competitors are responding to sustainability, how to 
effectively balance sustainability outcomes, changing interests of shareholders (e.g. their increasing 
interests in environmental and social outcomes), and the long-term economic and reputational benefits of 
implementing environmental and social strategies. Therefore, training in the area of sustainability is likely 
to alter the economic-based biases of insiders and expand the cognitive skills needed to incorporate 
stakeholder-orientated thinking into their decision-making. Hence:  
Hypothesis 2: Sustainability training positively moderates the insider-sustainability performance 
relationship. Specifically, the negative relationship between insiders on the board and 
sustainability performance is positively moderated by sustainability training offered to corporate 
officers residing on the board. 
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Company code of conduct 
Generally, a company code of conduct is a formal document in which a firm declares its ethical 
responsibility toward various stakeholders and describes a set of rules to guide the behaviour of all 
employees towards those stakeholders. According to Ählström (2010: 73), a comprehensive code of 
conduct not only embodies behavioural expectations of employees towards stakeholders, but is also “a 
document with written rules on environmental and social issues set up by the corporation”; in other 
words, company codes of conduct that are comprehensive in nature codify a sustainability ethic. Although 
a company code of conduct is not legally binding and is voluntary in nature, it is expected to change 
employee mind-sets about sustainability and value creation (Engen & DiPiazza 2005). Hence, 
comprehensive company codes of conduct are expected to influence how inside directors perceive and 
respond to sustainability. This influence is expected to take two prominent forms.  
First, identity theory suggests that organisations develop meaning structures, and that these 
meaning structures provide the historical and cultural resources as well as the available organisational 
discourses for processes of identity formation (Deetz 1994). As a consequence, organisations have tended 
to become more active in manufacturing identification (Alvesson & Willmott 2002). They aim at 
directing the processes of self-identity formation and reproduction in a direction that serves the 
organisation, channelling the identification processes of employees in order to make them internalize the 
various identities associated with and implied by the organisation. This leads to the second aspect of 
influence, control. 
Incorporating issues of categorization and positioning employees into processes of control is one 
of the ways in which organisations become active in managing identification (Alvesson & Willmott 
2002). The term “unobtrusive forms of control” relates to a mode of control that intends to influence and 
regulate knowledge about the social conditions in organisations, along with the positioning of the 
individual within them (Willmott 1993). Following Alvesson and Willmott (2002), dominating actors in 
organisations, such as management, use various means of subtle control, or “soft power” (Schwartz 
2001), to direct employee behaviour. While a company code of conduct is not granted any agency 
(Jensen, Sandström & Helin 2009), it is not automatically adopted and followed in organisations; it is 
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used strategically by management to influence employees’ identities within the organisation, such that 
behaviour is controlled in a direction that positively serves the organisation.  
Given that company codes of conduct are targeted at all employees, the expectation is that in their 
absence, insiders are less likely to give due attention and consideration to the expectations of behaviour 
related to environmental and social matters of the firm. Alternatively, the presence of a comprehensive 
company code of conduct would be expected to shift insider attention to sustainability. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3: A comprehensive company code of conduct positively moderates the insider-
sustainability performance relationship. Specifically, the negative relationship between insiders 
on the board and sustainability performance is positively moderated by a comprehensive 
company code of conduct. 
METHODS 
Sample 
This study uses firms that were Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 300 listed from 2002-2009 and 
that have been rated by the Sustainable Investment Research Institute (SIRIS), an independent specialist 
research group providing sustainability and governance investment research in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
For each of the companies in the ASX300 index, SIRIS profiles multiple indicators relating to 
environmental and social dimensions, which are rated on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).  
Dependent variable 
According Baumgartner and Ebner (2010), due to the nature of sustainability, the measurement of the 
economic viability dimension needs to consider a future-orientated indicator. Thus, following Rose and 
Thomsen (2004), market value measurements are deemed better to capture future prospects; therefore, the 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) was used, calculated from data obtained from FinAnalysis. For the 
environmental and social dimensions, the SIRIS rating system was used (see Table 1 for a summary of 
indicators). The environment and social outcomes used the SIRIS ratings of 100 (best) to 0 (worst) for 
each indicator in the respective dimension.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The literature acknowledges that though sustainability performance consists of three dimensions, 
these dimensions can be considered an integrated whole (Hahn, Figge, Pinske & Preuss 2010). Thus, to 
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derive a composite index of sustainability performance, this study relied on the work of Krajnc and 
Glavič (2005). To do this, because the units of measure differ, each item was first normalized to a value 
of between 0 and 1 for the economic, environmental, and social dimensions. Once normalized, the five 
year (2005-2009) mean was taken to derive a sustainability performance score for each dimension. Lastly, 
proponents suggest that truly sustainable firms give equal treatment and consideration to each dimension 
of sustainability (Hahn et al. 2010). Hence, following the sustainability literature and based on the 
recommendation of Krajnc and Glavič (2005: 204), scores for the individual dimensions were therefore 
given equal weight and added together to create a composite sustainability performance measure. 
Independent and moderating variables 
Data collected for the independent and moderating variables was obtained from DatAnalysis, FinAnalyis, 
and SIRIS for the period 2002-2004 and three year averages were calculated. Insider presence was 
measured by dividing the number of inside directors by board size. For the moderating variables, first, to 
assess managerial incentives, SIRIS data was used. Specifically, SIRIS rates the extent to which senior 
officers’ (including those that are board members) compensation is tied to environmental and social 
performance. Using strict criteria, SIRIS rates compensation on a scale from 0 to 100 (with quantitative 
evidence receiving higher scores). For sustainability training, company annual and supplemental reports 
(i.e. board of directors, CSR, sustainability) were sourced and examined. Following Ricart et al. (2005), if 
evidence was found that training on sustainability was provided to top corporate officers (including 
officers who were board members), the training variable was coded 1, 0 otherwise.1 
Lastly, to determine the presence of a valid code of conduct in the context of this study, two 
criteria were used. First, the code had to be a company code of conduct rather than a supplier code etc. 
Second, the code had to include rules and standards on environmental and social dimensions. This was 
determined by reviewing each firm’s company code of conduct, and determining if the codes had sections 
in the table of contents targeting employee health and safety, human rights, environmental protection, 
                                                 
1 First, keywords searched included “sustainability” and “training” and “induction training” and 
“sustainability”. Second, where matched keywords were identified, the documents were examined further 
to determine if such training was provided to top corporate officers, including those on the board. This 
was generally evidenced if firms described providing sustainability training to their “top corporate 
officers on the board”, “officers on the board”, or “executives on the board”. 
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engaging local communities, and dealing with stakeholders, which are expected to be included as areas of 
environmental and social foci in comprehensive company codes of conduct (Ählström 2010). Where the 
code met the two criteria, it was coded 1, 0 otherwise. Finally, to avoid collinearity in the regression 
analysis, interaction variables were mean-centred. 
Control variables 
Because of the sample size, care was taken in choosing control variables to ensure model parsimony. To 
control for firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets was taken. Slack in more fungible financial 
resources is expected to offer management the opportunity to take advantage of emergent business and 
investment needs such as those that environmental and social programs and activities are likely to require. 
Therefore, financial slack was calculated as current assets minus current liabilities (Brealey & Myers 
1996). Due to their power, CEO duality was controlled for by assessing the presence or absence of the 
role in each year (where CEO duality = 1, 0 otherwise). Inside director shareholdings in the firm are 
expected to positively impact economic performance. However, holding shares in the firm could be 
detrimental to overall sustainability performance. To control for any confounding effects, the sum of all 
shares held by insiders was divided by total shares outstanding. To control for their effects on 
sustainability performance, the proportion of outside directors on the board was included. However, even 
after mean centring, variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance values (TOL) indicated a very high 
level of collinearity with inside directors (VIF = 20.49; TOL = .049). This is considered too high for 
regression analysis (O’Brien 2007). Hence, outsider shareholdings (sum of all shares held by outside 
directors divided by total shares outstanding) was substituted, which eliminated the multicollinearity 
problem. 
Lastly, industry was controlled for by grouping firms into three categories related to 
environmental and social impact, namely high impact (consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, 
industrials, and materials), medium impact (financials, health care, and utilities), and low impact 
(information technology, property trusts, and telecommunications services) industries (FTSE Group 
2010). For measurement, high impact industries were coded 3, medium impact coded 2, and low impact 
coded 1. With the exception of industry, all other variables included the means from 2002-2004. 




Means, standard deviations, and correlations are presented in Table 2. Multicollinearity was checked by 
assessing tolerance values and variation inflation factors (VIF). The lowest tolerance value was .619 
while the highest VIF was 1.617, suggesting that multicollinearity did not create problems with statistical 
tests (O’Brien 2007). Finally, in order to test the hypotheses, some firms had to be eliminated because 
they were not included in the ASX300 listing across the entire period under study. This was mainly due to 
acquisitions and delistings. Hence, the final sample size was 241. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The hypotheses were tested with moderated regression analysis (Table 3). Model 1 contains only 
the control variables. As expected, firm size (β = 0.41; p < 0.001) and industry (β = 0.19; p < 0.001) are 
positively and significantly related to sustainability performance. Financial slack is negatively (β = -0.18; 
p < 0.01) related to sustainability performance. This could suggest that over the period studied, firms had 
excess resources that were not being used to advance sustainability strategies and outcomes. As expected, 
insider shareholdings is negative and significant (β = -0.16; p < 0.05). Lastly, of note, although the 
relationship between outsider shareholdings and sustainability performance is not significant, it is 
negative (β = -0.10; n.s.). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The addition of the main effects in Model 2 explains significantly more variance than Model 1 
(∆R2 = 0.24; p < 0.001). Insiders are negatively associated with sustainability performance (β = -0.16; p < 
0.01), suggesting that in the absence of contingency variables, they are likely to influence board decisions 
in a way that that does not favour sustainability performance. Alternatively, compensation linked to 
environmental and social metrics (β = 0.13; p < 0.05) and sustainability training (β = 0.44; p < 0.001) are 
positive and significantly related to sustainability performance. A comprehensive company code of 
conduct, while positive, is not significant (β = 0.04; n.s.).  
The three interaction terms in Model 3 test the moderating hypotheses. The addition of the 
interaction terms in Model 3 explains significantly more variance than Model 2 (∆R2 = 0.03; p < 0.05). As 
shown in Table 3, the insider-compensation interaction is positive and significant (β-interaction = 0.28; p 
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< 0.05), offering support for Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the insider-sustainability training interaction is 
positive and significant (β-interaction = 0.23; p < 0.05), supporting Hypothesis 2. Lastly, modest support 
for Hypothesis 3 is found as the insider-comprehensive company code of conduct interaction is also 
positive and significant (β-interaction = 0.11; p < 0.10).  
DISCUSSION 
This study offers three main contributions. First, it advances research on inside directors by taking a 
contingency approach. Second, the literature discusses the “balance” problem with respect to 
sustainability. When using agency theory and learning, and identity and control literatures to study this 
problem, perhaps surprisingly, that, in line with “paradox” theories, simultaneously employing 
“competing” mechanisms could lead to greater balance environmental, social, and economic performance. 
Third, the findings have practical implications for the evaluation of insiders’ impact on performance and 
the policies that these evaluations give rise to. Each of these contributions is discussed below. 
 The first important implication is that this study advances research on inside directors. Following 
contingency approaches to corporate governance (Boyd 1995), this study examined compensation linked 
to environmental and social metrics, sustainability training, and comprehensive company codes of 
conduct as positive moderating influences on the insider-sustainability performance relationship. The 
results are in the affirmative and confirm previous studies that suggest that the value of insiders is 
contingent upon certain conditions (e.g. Coles et al. 2008). A key implication of the findings is that 
advancing research on insiders could be fruitful for researchers (cf. Fairfax 2010). However, what needs 
to be better understood are the obstacles that might impede the value of insiders from being realised, and 
the mechanisms that can change—or at least shift—entrenched insider behaviours and biases so that they 
positively influence sustainability performance, as well as other firm outcomes.    
A second reason this study is important is that it explores balance when addressing sustainability. 
For example, the findings suggest that insiders and insider shareholdings are negatively and significantly 
associated with sustainability performance. What this might indicate is that insiders (with or without 
shareholdings) generally prioritize economic performance over environmental or social performance. 
However, certain mechanisms (e.g. compensation linked to environmental and social metrics, 
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sustainability training, and comprehensive company codes of conduct) might persuade or influence 
insiders to consider a broader performance dynamic—one that necessitates meeting broader stakeholder 
interests so that environmental and social performance can be achieved. Therefore, an implication of the 
findings is that firms might need to be considerate of the management incentives (and other mechanisms) 
they use to influence sustainability performance. 
The third contribution is that practical implications arise from the findings. Recent corporate 
governance reforms have meant it has become almost axiomatic that independent boards are the most 
effective boards. However, the empirical evidence does not support this proposition. A number of studies 
find conflicting evidence—if any—that independent boards lead to better outcomes, especially financial 
ones (e.g. Finegold, Benson & Hecht 2007). Hence, for policy makers, the findings suggest that evolving 
corporate governance reforms that call for greater board independence might need to be more questioned, 
and the value of insiders more carefully examined.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As with all empirical research, this study is not without limitations. First, reverse causality was not 
directly tested. However, by considering moderating effects, some of the causal relationships are 
represented more explicitly and reverse causality is made less likely. Second, although a case for their 
inclusion was made, the study is limited to three moderating variables. While the results are promising, 
there are potentially many other variables that moderate the insider-sustainability performance 
relationship. For example, future studies could explore more traditional boards of directors’ variables 
such as age, level of education, tenure, and functional or occupational background, determining if these 
influence positively (or negatively) the impact that insiders have on sustainability performance. Third, 
previous research on insiders suggests network ties are a determining factor as to whether or not insiders 
add value in terms of sustainability to boards and to the firms they oversee (Coles et al. 2008). That this 
study did not examine the outside directorships of insiders is also a limitation. Future corporate 
governance and sustainability performance studies could include this dimension.    
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Table 1. SIRIS environmental and social indicators 
 
Dimension of sustainability Indicator areas 
Environmental integrity 
(55 indicators in total) 
 Firms are rated on the extensiveness to which they incorporate 
environmental management programs in their operations, and 
achieve environmental quality program certifications (e.g. 
ISO14000). 
 Firms are rated on the extent to which they demonstrate 
management over materials, energy, and water consumption and 
their use of renewable energy. 
 Firms are rated on the extent to which they demonstrate 
management of CO2/GHG emissions and provide evidence of 
CO2/GHG emission reductions. 
 Firms are rated on how well they manage post-consumer and 
solid wastes and their waste emission impact on water and land. 
Social responsiveness 
(30 indicators in total) 
 Firms are rated on the extensiveness of occupational health and 
safety programs, reductions in health and safety incidents, 
extensiveness of employee training, and health and safety 
accreditation (e.g. Australian and New Zealand Occupational 
Health and Safety Standard 4801). 
 Firms are rated on the extensiveness of their corporate donations 
and community engagement, and the extent to which they uphold 
human rights and fair trade practices in their business practices. 
 Firms are rated on the extent to which they improve product 
quality, use product life cycle assessments, and achieve product 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Sustainability performance (normalized) 0.16 0.08 1.00
2. Firm size (logarithm of) 2.60 1.08 0.43** 1.00
3. Financial slack ($M) 392.54 3336.22 -0.23** 0.40** 1.00
4. Industry 2.22 0.95 0.18** -0.27** -0.02 1.00
5. CEO duality 0.07 0.24 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 1.00
6. Insider shareholdings (%) 5.18 1.00 -0.28** -0.46** -0.14* 0.07 0.10 1.00
7. Outsider shareholdings (%) 5.50 2.47 -0.45** -0.55** -0.17* 0.06 0.04 0.49** 1.00
8. Inside director proportion  0.29 0.17 -0.24** -0.35** -0.19** 0.06 -0.02 0.55** 0.16* 1.00
9. Compensation linked to E&S metrics 36.64 21.43 0.26** 0.20** 0.16* 0.06 -0.13 -0.17* -0.24** 0.09 1.00
10. Sustainability training 0.09 0.16 0.56** 0.36** 0.17* 0.19** -0.02 -0.20** -0.38** 0.15* 0.15* 1.00
11. Comprehensive company code of conduct 0.20 0.40 0.17** 0.13* 0.11 -0.14* -0.08 0.05 -0.11 0.03 0.14* 0.18** 1.00
 
* p  = 0.05; ** p  = 0.01 
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Table 3. Regression results (n=241) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controls
Firm size 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.31***
Financial slack -0.18** -0.18** -0.18**
Industry 0.19*** 0.13* 0.12*
CEO duality -0.05 -0.02 -0.01
Insider shareholdings -0.16* -0.03 -0.05
Outsider shareholdings -0.10 -0.06 -0.05
Main effects
Insiders -0.16** -0.09
Compensation linked to E&S metrics 0.13* 0.11
Sustainability training 0.44*** 0.62***
Comprehensive company code of conduct 0.04 0.06
Interactions
Insiders x compensation linked to E&S metrics 0.28*
Insiders x sustainability training 0.23*
Insiders x comprehensive company code of conduct 0.11
Model F 9.16*** 15.91*** 13.11***
R




 p  < 0.10; * p  < 0.05; ** p  < 0.01; *** p  < 0.001
 (E) environmental & (S) social  
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